DISARMAMENT

Newsletter

Newsletter of the
World Disarmament Campaign
Volume 9, Number 4
August 1991

United Nations

Contents

New proposals to limit arms proliferation 2
Downward trend in arms transfers 4
UK to cut military force levels 5
Finishing START 5
Argentina ends ballistic missile programme 5
France decides to accede to NPT 6
South Africa accedes to NPT 6
North Korea and IAEA safeguards 6
UN postage stamps on banning chemical weapons 7
The 1990 comprehensive study on nuclear weapons 8
WTO holds final session 9
The 1991 UN Disarmament Commission session 10
Workshop for Diplomats 11
First UN inspection of Iraqi CW capabilities 12
Ballistic missile destruction 13
Nuclear inspection team briefs Security Council 13
Hungary and Romania sign Open Skies agreement 14
UNIDIR tenth anniversary lecture series 14
Kyoto Conference on disarmament issues 15
NGO news items 16

The cover photograph depicts an Iraqi Al Hussein missile being destroyed on 3 July at Al Taji, 30 km north of Baghdad.

Information published by the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs may be requested from the World Disarmament Campaign, DDA, Room S-3100, United Nations, New York, N.Y. 10017, USA; or from the Geneva Branch, DDA, Palais des Nations, CH-1211, Geneva 10, Switzerland; the Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, Mcal. Blas Cerdeña 450, San Isidro, Lima, Perú or the Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, P.O. Box 107 Pulchowk, Kathmandu, Nepal.

Disarmament Newsletter
February 1991 – Vol.9 No.4
The Disarmament Newsletter is published bi-monthly by the United Nations

New proposals to limit arms proliferation

In connection with the war in the Persian Gulf, there have been renewed concerns about the acquisition of advanced weapons by countries in regions of political tension. Recent pronouncements by major world leaders have provided a number of responses to this concern.

An early proposal to control exports and limit acquisitions was put forward in February by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada. He called for a world summit under United Nations auspices that would lead to a comprehensive network of specific non-proliferation regimes for weapons of mass destruction and missiles, and for greater transparency and constraint regarding the transfer of sophisticated conventional weapons.

One of the first proposals put forward at the end of the Gulf war was the suggestion of President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt for a new regional order in the Middle East based on mutual security, economic co-operation and democratic reforms in a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction – nuclear, chemical and biological. It would require States with a nuclear-weapons capability or a chemical-weapons capability to give it up.

On 22 April British Prime Minister John Major proposed that the United Nations consider setting up an effective system of monitoring the sales of arms to high-tension areas. He proposed an arms sales register where all transfers of conventional weapons would be recorded by suppliers. It would focus on the exports of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council who he said are "the most important arms producers in the world".

Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu of Japan put forward a number of proposals relating to non-proliferation at the UN Conference on Disarmament Issues in Kyoto on 27 May. He included suggestions for strengthening the NPT nuclear non-proliferation regime and improving IAEA safeguards. On conventional weapons he said his government planned to submit a draft resolution to the 1991 UN General Assembly supporting a United Nations system to monitor trade in these weapons. Japan would co-operate to help develop a system for reporting arms trade data to the United Nations.

In a 29 May speech, United States President George Bush proposed new "supplier guidelines on conventional arms exports; barriers to exports that contribute to weapons of mass destruction; a freeze now and later a ban on production of nuclear-weapons material". Mr Bush said that halting the proliferation of conventional and unconventional weapons in the Middle East – while supporting the legitimate need of every State to defend itself – would require the co-operation of many States, in the region and around the world.

In background discussion of the United States proposal, the White House Press Secretary said it was intended to curb the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons in the Middle East and the missiles that can deliver them, and to restrain the build-up of destabilizing conventional arms in the region. Asserting that proliferation is a global problem that must find a global solution, the White House statement said that, at the same time, the current situation in the Middle East posed unique dangers and opportunities so that the President's proposal would concentrate on that

region as its starting point while it would be complemented by other initiatives that had been put forward by other world leaders.

On 31 May, President Mitterrand of France presented a plan which concerned both weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons. He announced that the five permanent members of the Security Council, the major producers of conventional weapons, would hold a round of consultations in Paris to try to work out rules for restraint – a process which could then be broadened at the 1991 session of the General Assembly to include an international arms sales register to be kept by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Conventional arms exports should not, the French plan stated, "work against the region-by-region search for a balance of power at the lowest possible level consistent with each State's right to security".

A United Nations arms trade register has broad support in the European Community where it has been endorsed as an alternative to tight EC controls on the export of conventional weapons.

The Soviet Union has expressed similar views endorsing proposals for a United Nations registry to keep track of the transfer of conventional weapons. It has also supported the idea of a Middle East zone that would be free from nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and the means of delivery.

Australia and New Zealand have also expressed support for a UN register of arms sales.

Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu, on 15 June, said that China would participate in the international conference in Paris on limiting arms sales to the Middle East.

An American M1Abrams main battle tank shown on patrol in the Saudi Arabian desert.The Abrams has been sold to Saudi Arabia and is to be manufactured in Egypt.(Photo: US Army)

The consultations between the five permanent members of the Security Council took place on 8 and 9 July in Paris. The representatives agreed to support continued work in the United Nations on an arms transfer register to be established under the aegis of the UN Secretary-General. They stressed that the ultimate response to the threat of proliferation is verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements amongst the parties concerned and they expressed strong support for the full implementation of existing arms control regimes. For their part, they would contribute to this objective by developing and maintaining stringent national and harmonized controls to ensure that weapons of mass destruction related equipment and material are transferred for permitted purposes only and are not diverted.

The permanent members of the Security Council also strongly supported the objective of establishing a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone in the Middle East. They expressed their view that critical steps toward this goal should include full implementation of UN Security Council resolution 687 and adoption by countries in the region of a comprehensive programme of arms control for the region, including a freeze and ultimate elimination of ground-to-ground missiles, submission by all nations in the region of all of their nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards, a ban on the importation and production of nuclear weapons usable materials, and agreements by all States in the region to undertake to become parties to the chemical weapons convention as soon as it is concluded.

Recognizing that indiscriminate transfers of military weapons and technology contribute to regional instability, they affirmed their consciousness of their special responsibilities to ensure that such risks be avoided. They recognized that a long-term solution to this problem should be found in close consultation with recipient countries.

The permanent members of the Security Council further expressed their intentions to observe rules of restraint when considering conventional weapons transfers under their national control. As a matter of priority they would also exchange information and consult with each other concerning arms transfers to the Middle East, and a group of experts is to meet in September with a view to reaching agreement on this approach.

Another plenary meeting will be held in October in London and further meetings will be held periodically to review these issues. The representatives of the five permanent members of the Security Council expressed the conviction that this process of continuing co-operation would contribute to a worldwide climate of vigilance in the field which other countries will share.□

READEX FICHE

Downward trend in arms transfers

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has reported that the global value of trade in major conventional weapons was 35% lower in 1990 than in 1989, which was itself lower than the figures recorded for the years of the mid-1980s. The decline from 1989 to 1990 was $US 21.7 billion ,stated in constant 1985 dollars.

The value of trade deliveries of major conventional weapons in 1990 was less than two thirds of the value recorded for 1987, a peak year.

Within the overall total of deliveries, the share going to third world countries was the same in 1990 as was recorded for 1989: 55% of the total.

These are among the data reported in the 1991 *SIPRI Yearbook* and summarized in a detailed press release of 24 May which is the basis for the text of this article.

The Soviet Union and the United States remained the largest exporters of major weapons in 1990, together accounting for 69% of the total value of deliveries. However, in 1990 the value of US arms deliveries exceeded the value of Soviet exports, reversing an established rank order. Soviet exports fell rapidly in 1990 primarily due to drastically reduced exports to third world countries – particularly to India, Iraq and Afghanistan, but also as a result of the political changes in the Warsaw Treaty Organization. In 1989 the Soviet Union and the United States accounted for 37% and 34% respectively of the world total; in 1990 the respective shares were 29% and 40%.

The member countries of the European Community accounted for 21% of the total value of major weapons delivered in 1990. This share was constant during the period 1986-1990. However, within this total, the share of deliveries accounted for by France, the UK and the Federal Republic of Germany – the three largest arms producers in Western Europe – rose significantly to over 90%.

The value of arms exports by developing countries continued to decline in 1990, representing just over 1% of total exports compared with over 4% in 1987. These figures exclude the production of such items as small arms and artillery with a calibre of less than 100 mm.

In 1990 the largest arms-importing country was Saudi Arabia, reflecting the immediate impact of the crisis stemming from the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. The arms imports of other countries in the Persian Gulf region, notably the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, also increased significantly in 1990. Elsewhere in the Middle East, however, the pattern of reduced arms imports continued. For the period 1986 to 1990, Iraq remained a major importer, although its 1990 imports of major conventional weapons was insignificant. As of December 1990, Israeli arms imports had not returned to the level of the mid-1980s, and there was no evidence that Syria or Libya, previously among the largest arms importers, received any new major conventional weapons.

The Persian Gulf crisis notwithstanding, global deliveries of new major weapon systems have continued to fall for several reasons: first, because of the lack of hard currency in many third world countries that were major importers in the past, combined with the increased cost of modern weapons; second, key recipients – notably Angola, Syria, Libya and North Korea – have reduced their imports of major weapons, and three other recipients – Iraq, Jordan and Kuwait – have been affected by embargo, restrictions on imports or occupation; third, the transfer of arms originally intended for Europe may, following the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), have reduced orders for major new conventional weapons; and fourth, with fierce competition for the remaining contracts in countries such as Japan, India, Saudi Arabia and South Korea, recipient governments have demanded more favourable terms, offsets and counter-trade agreements.

There is a general but gradual movement away from national and towards transnational arms production with an increasing number of co-operative projects involving technology and components of more than one country. A second tendency in arms procurement relates to the increasing importance of retrofitting or upgrading existing weapon systems instead of investing in the development of new major weapon platforms. Both trends have consequences for arms transfer control and for the reporting of arms transfers.□

Major Arms Importers 1983-1988



Source: US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

UK to cut military force levels

In its 9 July White Paper entitled "Britain's Defence for the 90s", the Government of the United Kingdom announced its programme to reduce the size of British military forces by 20% over the next three years.

Over that time period, total British force levels will be cut by 62,000 from the current strength of 308,000 with Army troop levels reduced by more than 40,000 to 116,000, the Royal Air Force reduced by 14,000 to 75,000 personnel and the Royal Navy and Marines cut by 8,000 to a force of 55,000.

Decisions to change British military force structures followed an "Options for Change" defence review in which the Government of the UK took account of the end of the cold war and the patterns of military needs during the war in the Persian Gulf.

The review is closely tied to a NATO review where the future military structure will incorporate new roles for British troops including a leading part in a new NATO Rapid Reaction Corps.

The UK defence budget for the 12 months from April 1991-April 1992 is £24.03 ($38.76) billion, a rise in real terms as a result of Gulf war related expenditures and its effects on other parts of the defence programme. It is planned that the budget will fall to £23.35 ($37.63) billion in 1993-94. There is a commitment to reduce the share of GDP taken by defence.

The equipment budget for the Services for 1991-92 is 39% of the total defence budget. The White Paper states that Ministry of Defence business currently supports about 450,000 British defence industry jobs, directly or indirectly. It is clear that fewer items of equipment will be required in the future and that this will also reduce the demand for support and spares. None the less the Ministry of Defence would remain the largest single customer of British industry.□

Ships of the British Royal Navy which contributed to enforcing the embargo seen on station in the Persian Gulf. (Photo: Statement on the Defence Estimates, page 12.)

Finishing START

On Wednesday 17 July, President George Bush of the United States and President Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union reached agreement on the final points that had blocked conclusion of the START treaty.

It is expected that the treaty will be signed at the summit meeting which will take place in Moscow on 30-31 July. A full description will be given in the next issue of the *Disarmament Newsletter*.□

Argentina ends ballistic missile programme

On 28 May the Argentine Government announced plans to ensure that an earlier decision to discontinue the Condor II missile project would be implemented. The missile's components would be rendered militarily useless. Key personnel working on the project would be transferred to a civilian agency open to supervision by the Argentine national congress.

The Condor II missile was known as the Badr-2000 missile in Egypt which had also participated in its development until it withdrew from the project in late 1989.

Announcing the Government's decision, the Argentine Defence Minister pledged to conform to the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and said that, far from contributing to security, the Condor II made Argentina more vulnerable, raised the level of instability in other regions of the world, and seriously affected Argentine national prestige.

New substantial cuts in military personnel and budgets were also announced on 28 May.□

France decides to accede to NPT

On 3 June, French President François Mitterrand announced that France, which already applied in practice all of the provisions of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, had decided in principle to accede to it and hoped that all States would do the same. Once France ratifies the NPT, it will become the fourth of the five declared nuclear-weapon States to be parties. The Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States were original parties and are its depositary States. China, which is not a party, has stated that it does not encourage nuclear proliferation. It has recently indicated that it is considering the possibility of becoming a party.□

Representatives of Sweden and of the United Kingdom at the opening session of the Fourth Review Conference of the NPT where both delegations played an active role in 1990. (UN photos 176152 and 176990)

South Africa accedes to NPT

On 10 July, South Africa acceded to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty of 1968. By this accession it committed itself to forgo the option to produce or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons and agreed to have all its nuclear facilities open to international inspection.

South Africa is now required to conclude within 18 months a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the inspection of all its nuclear facilities, including its plant at Valindaba near Pretoria that is believed to produce weapons-grade uranium.

In a statement of 27 June announcing the decision of the South African Cabinet to accede to the Treaty, President F.W. de Klerk said that major events in Central and Eastern Europe had changed the world order dramatically. The cold war had subsided and the last Cuban troops had withdrawn from Angola a month ahead of schedule. The threat of a conventional military conflict in the southern African region involving super-Power rivalry had diminished substantially, he stated. Worldwide there had been a growing acceptance of a commitment to the peaceful resolution of regional conflicts.

Following numerous discussions with the three depositary States – the USA, USSR and United Kingdom – and other interested parties, the South African Government indicated in September 1990 its willingness to accede to the Treaty in the context of a nuclear-free zone in southern Africa, Mr. de Klerk continued. Recent positive developments in the region, including the accession to the NPT of Zambia and Tanzania, had further enhanced the environment for peace and security. South Africa welcomed these accessions.

With the accession of South Africa, as well as Tanzania and Zambia to the NPT in 1991, and Mozambique and Albania late in 1990, there are now 144 States parties.□

North Korea and IAEA safeguards

On 16 July representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the secretariat of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) agreed to the text of a draft safeguards agreement permitting inspection of nuclear material in North Korea.

The draft agreement, which follows the standard pattern of safeguards agreements signed between parties to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty of 1968 and the IAEA, was drawn up in its final form during discussions held in Vienna from 12-16 July.

The agreement will be submitted for approval to the meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors to be held in Vienna on 11 September.

Safeguards are applied by IAEA to ensure that nuclear materials and equipment intended for peaceful purposes are not diverted to military purposes. North Korea, although a party to the 1968 nuclear non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) since December 1985, has not met its obligation to negotiate and conclude a safeguards agreement which the Treaty specifies should be done no later than eighteen months after a State becomes a party.

As of 31 December 1990, 177 safeguards agreements were in force covering over 900 nuclear facilities in 104 States, of which 86 were among the 141 States parties to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty at that date. There are now 144 States parties.□

UN postage stamps on banning chemical weapons

On 11 September the United Nations Postal Service will issue a series of six stamps on the banning of chemical weapons. It is being issued at this time in recognition of renewed concern regarding the large stocks of chemical weapons in several parts of the world, and the particular risks arising from the fact that these weapons and the materials and skills to make them have been exported to and developed in regions of high tension and war.

A comprehensive ban on the development, production, stockpiling and deployment of these weapons is being negotiated in the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament. The ban would also renew the existing prohibition under the 1925 Geneva Protocol against their use, and provide for the destruction of existing stockpiles and production facilities.

New momentum was given to the Geneva negotiations by the 13 May statement of President Bush that the United States was formally forswearing the use of chemical weapons even for retaliation, effective when the convention enters into force, and unconditionally committed itself to the destruction of all its stocks of chemical weapons within ten years of its entry into force.

This development in US policy met with positive reactions from a number of countries engaged in the negotiations. The Soviet Union welcomed the US announcement, and said that it would not object to removing from the draft negotiating text all references to an earlier Soviet/American proposal to retain two per cent of their chemical weapons stocks until all CW-capable States had joined the convention.

The recent war in the Persian Gulf has drawn attention to the particular dangers of increased trade in chemical weapons materials. This in turn has led to new decisions by 20 industrial nations to impose stricter controls on the export of 50 common chemicals that can be used to make munitions.

The United Nations stamp series consists of six stamps, three in a lower denomination: 30 US cents, 80 Swiss centimes and 5 Austrian schillings; and three stamps in a higher denomination: 90 US cents, 1.40 Swiss francs and 10 schillings. The lower denomination stamps were designed by Oscar Asboth who is of Hungarian origin and based in Vienna. They show the world threatened by chemical weapons which are symbolized by a sky with transparent spheres and floating death-mask skulls. The other three stamps were designed by Michel Granger of France and show a human hand pushing back canisters and clouds of chemical gases to resist chemical weapons.□

Lower denomination stamps designed by Oscar Asboth.

Higher denomination stamps designed by Michel Granger.

The 1990 comprehensive study on nuclear weapons

The quantitative growth of nuclear weapons has been stopped. The number of nuclear warheads is now declining. The likelihood of nuclear war has been significantly reduced. Technological improvements of nuclear weapons continue in several areas.

These are among the central conclusions reported in the United Nations 1990 study entitled *Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons* (document A/45/373). The study represents the combined efforts of twelve government experts from Argentina, Bulgaria, Egypt, France, Indonesia, New Zealand, Senegal, the Soviet Union, Sri Lanka, Sweden, the United States and Venezuela.

The group's report is organized into nine chapters, the first and last serving as introduction and conclusion. Chapters two through eight address the following subjects: technical data on existing nuclear weapons; trends in technological development; nuclear doctrines; development, production, and testing of nuclear weapons; the effects of nuclear weapons' use; nuclear weapons and international security; and nuclear arms limitation and disarmament agreements.

Written at a time when great changes were taking place in Eastern Europe and in the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, the tone of the report is decidedly upbeat and differs markedly from a previous study completed in 1980. Nevertheless, some issues were clearly contentious and some recognized trends were not welcomed enthusiastically.

In 1990 the arsenals of China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States reportedly contained 50,000 nuclear warheads. (The experts believed that the estimate of 40,000 given in the 1980 report was too low and that 50,000 represented a decrease from peak inventories later in the 1980s.) More than 90 per cent of these weapons are in the inventories of the Soviet Union and the United States. Therefore, agreements concluded between these two countries which reduce their nuclear arsenals have the potential to reduce substantially the number of warheads in existence.

According to the report the pace of technological development has slowed down appreciably in the 1980s. However, qualitative improvements in nuclear weapon systems continue. Research is continuing on some weapons not yet deployed which are seen by many to be potentially troublesome. Warheads designed to penetrate deep into the ground before detonating, and multiple-warhead missiles whose payload is designed to evade interception are two such examples.

Not all technologies which are developed are necessarily deployed, however. The technical aspects of limiting the lethality of

Recent Nuclear Testing Data[1]

Country	First test	Current test site	Number of tests 1986	1987	1988	1989	All tests
United States	1945	Nevada	14	14	14	11	921
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	1949	Semipalatinsk/Novaya Zemlya	0[2]	23	17	7	642
United Kingdom	1952	Nevada	1	1	0	1	42
France	1960	Mururoa/Fangataufa	8	8	8	8	180
China	1964	Lop Nor, Sinkiang	0	1	1	0	34

[1] "Nuclear Notebook", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 46, No. 3 (April 1990), p. 57; see also Ragnhild Ferm, "Nuclear Explosions", in SIPRI Year Book 1990, New York, Oxford University Press, 1990, pp. 56-57 (table 2.A.4)

[2] The USSR held a moratorium on testing August 1985-February 1987.

nuclear warheads are well understood, but very small, "mini" nuclear weapons have not been produced. The fear is that such weapons could blur the threshold between nuclear and conventional weapons.

There is a school of thought which believes that the development of new weapons ("vertical proliferation") would be drastically curtailed if nuclear testing was not permitted. The question of nuclear-weapon testing is particularly divisive. The report states that between 1945 and 1989 there were 1,819 tests recorded internationally (an average of one test every nine days). The annual number of tests has declined in recent years, however. Still, many feel that even one test is too much. Ecological and international security concerns are raised. The five States which have confirmed their nuclear status continue to conduct nuclear tests as part of their weapons programmes, believing such tests add to their deterrent value and enable them to improve their safety features and command and control components.

Regarding peaceful nuclear explosions (PNE), the report points out that the original optimism over their possible benefits has now been reversed. The combination of environmental problems, delicate arms control issues, cost, and security and safety problems have all contributed to a common understanding that PNE technology is generally impractical. (India is the only State, outside the group of declared nuclear-weapon States, known to have carried out an explosion of a nuclear device. Conducted in 1974, India declared it to have been for peaceful purposes.)

The issue of horizontal proliferation (an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons) is also addressed. The study enumerates the technical, political, legal and economic constraints which exist to deter other States from joining the nuclear club.

Currently, the report says, there is international consensus that, although measures are necessary to prevent the proliferation of nuclear-weapon States, all States have the right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. However, some States are concerned that the necessary material and technologies needed for peaceful uses will not be made available on the grounds that they could facilitate the development of a weapons capability.

These few examples indicate the participants' desire to take divergent and conflicting views into account and present as balanced and thorough an examination as possible. The group submitted the study to the Secretary-General with its unanimous approval.

Two annexes complement the work. The first contains submissions by China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States describing their nuclear doctrines. The second consists of a chart enumerating and describing the land- and sea-based nuclear weapons of those five States.□

WTO holds final session

Meeting in Prague on 1 July, representatives of the member States of the Warsaw Treaty Organization signed a protocol on terminating the validity of the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance which had been signed in Warsaw on 14 May 1955.

The protocol, which is subject to ratification, was signed by representatives of the six WTO member States: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia Federal Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the USSR.

Participants at the signing session issued a statement in which they voiced support for the further development of the all-European process, in the interest of creating new structures of security and co-operation on the continent in accordance with the results achieved at the CSCE Summit in November 1990, and to promote the formation of an all-European framework of co-operation in the areas of security, economics, law, culture, ecology, and the humanitarian sphere, as stated in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe.

They expressed the view that prosperity and the further development of democracy based on respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are in the interest of all participating States of the CSCE process.

They also expressed the readiness of their countries to hold bilateral or multilateral consultation on an *ad hoc* basis on topical issues of common interest, including issues linked with the fulfilment of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.□

The 1991 substantive session of the UN Disarmament Commission

Following changes in the working methods of the United Nations Disarmament Commission in 1989 and 1990, the 1991 session made greater progress than in many years. Each of the four Working Groups established a basis on which to prepare agreed proposals during the three-year period permitted for its agenda item.

Reporting for Working Group I dealing with objective information on military matters, the Group Chairman, Ambassador André Erdös of Hungary, said there was agreement about the need to further consolidate the trend towards greater openness and transparency in military matters. This was not an end in itself, but a confidence-building measure designed to promote disarmament.

In an annex to the report of Working Group I, the Chairman submitted suggested guidelines. Based on the guidelines adopted by consensus by the Commission at its 1988 substantive session, the Chairman proposed that the purposes of objective information on military matters are to:

- build confidence and promote specific disarmament agreements and other concrete disarmament measures leading to strengthened international peace and security;
- facilitate the process of arms limitation, reduction and elimination, and the verification of compliance;
- increase the predictability of military activities;
- assist States in determining the level of forces sufficient for an adequate defensive capability and in developing defensive military doctrines;
- avert crises and reduce the risk of military conflict, whether intentional or unintentional, by heading off dangerous errors of misperception which could generate or precipitate them;
- provide a basis for comprehensive public understanding of disarmament and security-related issues.

The Chairman's guidelines also specified principles and mechanisms to serve these objectives and four recommendations for further consideration:

- the UN reporting system on military expenditures could be given greater recognition through the voluntary submission of annual reports by a growing number of States, and by providing military expenditure figures on a per capita basis and as a percentage of GDP and information on armed forces and armaments, including chemical and bacteriological weapons;
- the establishment of a UN register on the transfer of conventional arms;
- periodic studies by experts of possible methods to make nationally supplied data internationally comparable;
- bilateral arrangements for reciprocal visits, exchange of military training manuals, and for reconnaissance flights over each other's territories.

Working Group II on the question of nuclear disarmament was chaired by Ambassador Amre Moussa of Egypt. The Chairman's paper attached to the report of the Working Group identified a number of elements which had been raised by the members of the group:

- the validity of the doctrine of nuclear deterrence;
- ways and means of achieving the priorities set out in the 1978 UN Special Session on Disarmament;

Ambassador Peter Hohenfellner (Austria) who served as Chairman of the UN Disarmament Commission in 1991 (UN Photo 175486/Grant)

- the question of a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing;
- the idea of a ban on the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;
- the prevention of vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons;
- security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States;
- nuclear-weapon-free zones;
- confidence-building measures;
- the role of the United Nations system;
- the role of the Conference on Disarmament;
- verification of nuclear disarmament;
- discussion of bilateral nuclear disarmament agreements.

The Chairman of Working Group III on the regional approach to disarmament, Ambassador Nugroho Wisnumurti of Indonesia, reported a convergence of views. His Chairman's paper included the following principles and guidelines:

- regional disarmament agreements should come from within the region;
- any regional approach to disarmament has to take into account the specific conditions and characteristics of the region;
- in any regional disarmament process, it is important to seek the elimination of the most destabilizing military capabilities and imbalances;

- regions where serious military confrontation and high armaments concentrations exist should lead in concluding and implementing disarmament agreements.

In discussing the ways and means of following such principles and guidelines, the Chairman's paper commends the guidelines for confidence-building measures adopted by the UNDC in 1988 as a basis for States to use in their regional approach to arms limitation and disarmament. It recommends a number of arms limitation and disarmament measures so as to establish a military balance at a low level of armaments and forces and at military spending levels not exceeding self-defence requirements. The Chairman's paper also recommends the establishment of zones of peace and zones free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in various regions as would be defined and determined freely by the States concerned in the zone.

Ambassador Luiz de Araujo Castro of Brazil, Chairman of Working Group IV introduced its report on the role of science and technology in the context of international security under four substantive headings.

The Working Group considered, under sub-item 1, the issues raised in resolutions which called for following the scientific and technological developments that may have a negative impact on security. Under sub-item 2, it considered the issues relating to the use of technical achievements for disarmament-related purposes such as verification, weapons disposal and the conversion of military industry to civilian purposes.

Sub-item 3 addressed the use of resources currently allocated to military activities for the purposes of economic and social development and for promoting civilian endeavours to protect the environment, and sub-item 4 was concerned with the suggestion made by the Secretary-General in his report to the 1990 General Assembly that the international community make a special effort to clarify the important issues involved in providing developing countries unimpeded access to the benefits of modern science and technology.

Although sound work was done by the Working Groups, there was disappointment that no item was scheduled for early completion. Ambassador Peggy Mason of Canada said that when it came time to fulfil the mandate of the UNDC to make specific recommendations, delegations took the position that "since we had three years to consider three of the four items, and one more year for the fourth item, why should we attempt to agree to anything substantive this year".

"In the past, when every aspect of the UN was frozen in the prism of the cold war confrontation, to have a constructive discussion of issues was a worthwhile goal in and of itself, but now that action is possible, discussion, however constructive, is simply not good enough", she stated.□

Ambassador Peggy Mason of Canada.

Workshop for Diplomats

Twenty Latin American and Caribbean countries sent diplomats to a United Nations workshop on disarmament and international security held in Mexico City from 1 to 5 July.

The workshop began with three speeches and discussion on regional security. One dealt with regional approaches to enhance security and prospects for conventional arms limitation in Latin America and the Caribbean. Another addressed the topic regional efforts to strengthen the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and a third provided an assessment of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

In a later session the speakers and the participants considered confidence-building measures in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Central American negotiations on the control and limitation of armaments and military forces.

The main focus of the workshop concerned the Geneva negotiations on a comprehensive convention to ban the development, production, deployment and possession of chemical weapons. An overview session was followed by discussion of the scope of the convention and the current status of negotiations. A session on issues concerning verification and compliance then led into presentations and discussion on institutional machinery for implementing the convention and on national implementation.

The workshop concluded with sessions on approaches for resolving outstanding questions in the negotiations on the convention and on the impact of bilateral agreements on these multilateral negotiations. There was also an evaluation session followed by closing remarks.□

First UN inspection of Iraqi CW capabilities

The United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) set up by Security Council resolution 687, carried out its first exploratory inspection of the Muthanna State Establishment – also known as the State Enterprise for Pesticide Production and referred to in the media as the "Samarra facility" – in Iraq over the period 9-14 June 1991.

The purpose was to get a detailed description of the site, including the nature and condition of the facilities, chemical warfare agents, chemical munitions and precursor chemicals on the site and an indication of the hazards present to make possible a full inspection of the site to be carried out at a later stage and to make an initial assessment of the suitability of the site as the main location for the destruction of Iraq's chemical weapons capabilities.

The inspection was carried out by a team of 20 experts from eight different countries and the World Health Organization. The specialist skills in the team included explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), structural engineering, chemical weapons, chemical agent detection, decontamination, chemical monitoring, biochemistry, and microbiology. The team was also supported by two interpreters, a photographer, a recorder, a communicator and two administrative officers.

Conditions in many areas of the site are reported to be hazardous in the extreme due to destruction or damage as a result of the bombing during the hostilities, to leaking chemical munitions and chemical agent bulk containers and to some unexploded ordnance. The safety of the inspection personnel was therefore a prime consideration.

An expert with the UN Special Commission inspects Iraqi process control equipment.

The presence on the site of mustard gas and organophosphorus nerve agents was verified, both as bulk agents and in the form of munitions, and evidence was found for the presence on the site of impure tabun, whose use in the Iran-Iraq war had been verified by the United Nations investigations of 1984, 1986 and 1987.

Most of the chemical warfare agents had been produced at Muthanna without any purification, resulting in a product with a limited shelf-life. Some of the decomposition products are gaseous, and thus potentially hazardous overpressure might be expected both in bulk containers and chemical munitions. The extensive survey of the Muthanna site, to be conducted later in the year, will require extensive sample-taking which will be very difficult.

All of the facilities for large-scale production of CW agents as well as for filling of CW munitions had been destroyed by the bombing during the hostilities. However, two sophisticated pilot plants, potentially capable of producing hundreds of kilograms of CW agents per day, were found to be intact and will require further investigation.

A number of precursor chemicals, mainly acquired from abroad, were also found, some in large quantities. The site also contained equipment obtained from a variety of sources.

The next steps will be a full inspection of the site and further discussions with the Iraqi authorities on the destruction process. Because of the size of the site and the extent of the facilities as well as the hazards involved, the full inspection will be a lengthy process.

The team found no evidence at this site of any undeclared activity related to biological, nuclear or missile capability and reported that the attitude of the Iraqi authorities involved in the inspection had been co-operative.

Under the terms of Security Council resolution 687, the embargo on Iraqi commodities and products, primarily oil, and on related financial transactions will be lifted only when the Council determines that Iraq has complied with all the requirements in the resolution relating to the elimination of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons capabilities and to ballistic missiles with a range over 150 km.□

Ballistic missile destruction

A team of international experts, visiting Iraq from 1-7 July, supervised the destruction of all the missiles which Iraq declared to be subject to Security Council resolution 687. The destruction operations, carried out in the vicinity of Baghdad, eliminated the actual missiles and their warheads as well as mobile launchers, fire control vehicles, missile transporters and fuel and fueling vehicles. In all, almost 300 major items were destroyed by the local Iraqi military under the supervision of a 19-person international team from the United Nations Special Commission representing some 12 nationalities with a wide range of skills in the ballistic missile area. Future teams will supervise the destruction of some fixed launch sites in the western part of Iraq and of several missile repair and production facilities.□

Iraqi destruction of missiles of more than 150 kilometres range under UN Special Commission supervision.

IAEA/UN Special Commission nuclear inspection team briefs Security Council

On 15 July, officials of the IAEA/United Nations team inspecting nuclear facilities in Iraq said that, based on the evidence of their inspections during May and June, it would be difficult to believe that Iraq's nuclear programme had been aimed at exclusively peaceful purposes. The electromagnetic separation process used would require an expenditure of five times more energy than the reactor would produce.

This was explained during a United Nations press briefing following an oral report to the Security Council on the work in Iraq to inspect nuclear facilities as called for under Security Council resolution 687 (1991). The briefing was by Rolf Ekeus, Executive Chairman of the Special Commission set up under Security Council resolution 687, Hans Blix, Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Maurizio Zifferero, Deputy Director-General of IAEA and head of the IAEA action team conducting the inspections in Iraq.

Mr. Ekeus said the team had presented some assessments based on the two nuclear inspections which had been carried out, and the third inspection, which was now being concluded in Baghdad. The team had also given an analysis of the Iraqi declarations, especially one received on 7 July, as well as additional information which had come out on Sunday, 14 July.

As regards the quantity of nuclear material that had been produced in Iraq that could be used for weapons, Mr. Ekeus said there were research facilities, pilot facilities and also two huge industrial-scale production facilities which had not yet been put into operation. One of those plants could have been made operational, it was estimated, within six to eighteen months.

Security Council resolution 687 requires IAEA to carry out immediate on-site inspections of Iraq's nuclear capabilities as declared by Iraq and of any additional locations designated by the Special Commission.

The first inspection of 14-22 May covered the main Iraq nuclear research facility at Al Tuwaitha and one additional site. At Al Tuwaitha, IAEA took custody of nuclear-weapons-usable material and applied Agency verification, containment and surveillance procedures, as required by resolution 687. However it was found that several buildings had been destroyed, not by military activities during the Gulf War but by extensive clearing operations carried out by Iraqi authorities during and after the conflict. In its report on its first two inspections IAEA said that much of the equipment had been removed to other locations.

A number of short-notice inspections were carried out at sites designated by the Special Commission. At one such site within the Abu Ghraib Army Barracks, the IAEA/Special Commission nuclear inspection team was denied access on 23 June and again on 25 June, despite a formal protest to the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs and meetings with the Foreign Ministry on 24 June. Also on 28 June the Iraqi military authorities denied an inspection team immediate access to a military transport facility, failed to comply with a request that there should be no movement of equipment pending inspection, and attempted to seize the cameras of members of the team and fired small arms into the air.

On 18 July the Board of Governors of IAEA adopted a resolution condemming the non-compliance by Iraq with its safeguards agreement.□

Open Skies Conference, Ottawa, Canada, 12-28 February 1990.

Hungary and Romania sign Open Skies agreement

On 11 May, Hungary and Romania agreed on an Open Skies regime giving each of them the right to conduct observation flights over the other party's territory. The agreement and its annexes contain detailed provisions regarding notification, pre- and post observation procedures and concerning the use of the information gathered. The document also specifies the sensors and other equipment that may be used.

Designated hazardous airspace areas are excluded from the permitted observation flight plans and the observation flight teams and equipment of each party may be inspected by the other. The observed party also has the right to have its own flight monitors on board the observation flights.

Both parties undertake not to interfere with the flights or the equipment of the other party, and have set up an Open Skies Consultative Commission to supervise the implementation of the agreement and to solve any problems that might arise.

The agreement is seen as anticipating and promoting an Open Skies Treaty within the context of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE).□

UNIDIR's tenth anniversary public lecture series

"Disarmament and Security in a Post-Cold-War Era" is the theme of a public lecture series at the United Nations at Geneva to mark the tenth anniversary of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.

The first lecture was given by Helmut Schäfer, German Minister of State for Foreign Affairs on 16 May on "Regional Disarmament and Confidence-Building Measures: Through Co-operation to Security".

On 3 June a second event in the series consisted of a panel discussion in co-operation with the United Nations Environment Programme on "Disarmament, Environment and Development and Their Relevance to the Least Developed Countries". The panelists included Mohamed Kassas of the University of Cairo, Inga Thorsson, Chairman of the Board of SIPRI, Johannes B. Opschoor of the Free University of Amsterdam, Arthur H. Westing of Westing Associates in Environment, Security and Education, Vermont, USA, and Mohammed Ishaq Talukdar of Bangladesh.

On 3 July, the Secretary-General gave a lecture and said that there was evidence of a profound reorientation of security policies which he hoped would abandon once and for all the pernicious logic of assuming the worst. The very dimensions of disarmament had been broadened and deepened.

From merely regulating the arms race, agreements now tended to involve disarmament, including destruction of existing arms and effective constraints on future production. The reorientation involved promotion of the regional dimension. Europe had provided one example, a testing ground. The success in what had been the area of the greatest concentration of weapons must have an impact elsewhere. Without trying to simply replicate the European agreements, the lesson to be learned, he said, was that of the specificity of each regional situation.

The deepening of the dimensions of disarmament included the success of the confidence- and security-building measures which represented a useful point of departure laying the foundation for more extensive negotiations. There was a further deepening implicit in the decisive progress achieved in the complex field of verification. There was no better proof of the new mood prevailing at disarmament negotiations than the on-site inspection formulas which were now found in recent agreements, Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar stated.

UNIDIR was established in 1980 on the initiative of France. Its statute was approved by the General Assembly in December 1984.

UNIDIR is an autonomous institution within the UN framework. Its focus is on in-depth, forward-looking and long-term research on disarmament carried out by individual experts under their own responsibility and contracted for specific projects. These features distinguish UNIDIR research projects from UN studies, which are mandated by the General Assembly and are typically worked out within the political context of working groups consisting of experts designated by Governments. The purpose of UN studies is to try to find common ground on outstanding disarmament problems and to delineate areas which may lend themselves to formal negotiations and agreements between Governments. Political consensus is, therefore, an essential element for the success of a UN study.□

Kyoto Conference on disarmament issues

Political leaders and disarmament experts from all parts of the world participated in the Second United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues at Kyoto, Japan from 27-30 May 1991. Major addresses were given by Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu of Japan, UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Yasushi Akashi, Foreign Minister Gareth Evans of Australia, Foreign Minister Raul Manglapus of the Philippines, Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovsky of the Soviet Union and Ambassador Ronald F. Lehman II of the United States. Additional presentations were given by a number of leading disarmament experts and other senior ambassadors.

In an opening statement, Mr. Yasushi Akashi said that the euphoria of the recent past had diminished and that the simple cleavages that had characterized the cold war had now been replaced by a more complicated and unstable set of global political relationships.

In the new era the diplomacy of disarmament had to be a pragmatic, step-by-step exercise. Politicians, experts, academics, military officers and diplomats would all need to be less occupied with the job of reinforcing the status quo between adversaries and more concerned with the task of steering worldwide political change in positive directions.

Kyoto conference hall

While such an approach to arms limitation and disarmament might appear too broad, in fact, he said, it simply reflected the trend towards enhanced communications and confidence-building measures and would also support the broader goal of collective security since arms reduction and confidence-building can help to create a basis for crisis prevention.

While agreements would not, by themselves, thwart aggression or prevent States from overarming, egregious behaviour is harder to hide when it occurs against a background of openness and stability.

The Conference worked in three Committees on:

- regional approaches
- proliferation
- implementation problems

In the Committee on regional approaches it was said that the tremendous achievements made in Europe were largely inapplicable in other regions. At the same time it was acknowledged that a multitude of regional efforts as in Latin and Central America and in South-East Asia and the Pacific had led to the emergence of a number of common principles that enjoy general support. One such principle was the idea of working to achieve balanced security at the lowest possible level of armaments and armed forces. Many participants felt that starting with a confidence-building process, particularly in regions of high tension, would make it possible to tackle contentious political issues and to reduce armaments.

Discussing the question of arms supplies from "outside Powers", many participants stated that imposing restrictions on supplies without involving the recipient States in the decisions might be detrimental to a long-lasting solution.

View of Kyoto meeting hall

In the discussion of arms transfers in the Second Committee it was widely agreed that new or enhanced non-proliferation measures would be best achieved as co-operative arrangements between supplier and recipient States. An important aspect for success would be the inclusion of weapons based on dual-purpose technologies, although it was observed that it would be neither desirable nor feasible to try to prevent the development or transfer of technology to meet civilian needs.

The Third Committee looked at problems arising out of disarmament measures. The first set of problems related to the destruction of weapons systems. Regarding the process of destroying chemical weapons, the discussion examined the experience of the United States and the Soviet Union. It was said that the cost of destruction of chemical weapons may be 3 to 10 times more than the cost of producing them. To some extent the costs of destruction of conventional weapons might be offset by using the scrap and metal that could be salvaged.

A second set of problems concerned those countries which are reducing their military expenditures and the question of the way this affects their economies. In a discussion of the anticipated peace dividend, it was felt that the cost of conversion, the cost of destruction of weapons and the costs of verification procedures might swallow up the peace dividend, at least in the short run.□

NGO news items

The brief report below on activities on non-governmental organizations includes some of the events and programmes which have come to the attention of the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs. The coverage does not imply any judgement by the United Nations.

The Irish Peace Institute and the Educational Studies Association of Ireland will host the "Education for Peace" Conference at the University of Limerick, Ireland, 4-5 October. The conference will focus on the prospects and potential of peace education as a power for building a better world. **Contact:** Irish Peace Institute, Conference Secretariat, University of Limerick, Plassey Campus, Limerick, Ireland. (Tel: 353 62 333644)

The Centre for the Study of Australia-Asia Relations, Brisbane, Australia, will host a conference on 15-16 September entitled "Security in the Asia/Pacific: The Challenge of a Changing Environment." Themes include the cold war security structure of the region and the changing security environment in the post-cold war. **Contact:** Secretary, Centre for the Study of Australia-Asia Relations, Griffith University, Nathan, QLD 4111 (Tel: 61 07 875 7916)

The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) will host "New Dimensions in International Security" in London from 12-15 September. Issues include the impact of the end of the cold war for international security, deterrence in the post-cold war era and the question of North-South confrontation for security. **Contact:**IISS, 23 Tavistock Street, London, WC2E 7NQ, UK (Tel: 071 379 7676)

Parliamentarians for Global Action is holding a series of consultations among leading national legislators from around the world on the building of an effective international security system in the post-cold war, post-Gulf conflict era. The first meeting which will be held 26-27 September 1991 in Washington DC will address "Non-Proliferation and the New World Order"; "Collective Security and Preventive Peacekeeping in the New World Order"; "An International Criminal Court"; and "Democracy in the New World Order." Dinner speakers sheduled to attend include Gen. Brent Scowcroft (USA) and Foreign Minister Amre Moussa of Egypt.- **Contact**: Parliamentarians for Global Action, 211 East 43rd Street, New York, NY 10017, USA (Tel: 1 212 687 7755, Fax:1 212 687 8409)

International Sane/Freeze is working with a number of NGOs to organize a conference of grassroots peace organizations from 31 October to 2 November. Intended to build public support to end international arms transfers and sales and to promote the value of the United Nations and the reasons it needs increased support form world political leaders, the conference will be held at the United Nations in New York. The first planning meeting was held on 10 July, and the second will be held on 11 September from 4 p.m. to 6:30pm at Church Center for the UN, 777 United Nations Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017. **Contact:** Sane/Freeze, 15 East 26th St., New York, N.Y. (Tel: 212 683 7906)

The United Nations Department for Public Information will hold its annual conference for NGO representatives from 11-13 September at United Nations Headquarters. The 1991 theme is "Peace, Justice and Development: Ingredients for an Emerging World Order." More than 1,000 representatives, their guests and members of the press, from 50 countries, attended the 1990 conference. In addition to Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar and Director-General Antoine Blanca who will open the meeting, speakers for the 1991 conference include Krim Ahmed of Princeton University, Noel Brown of the UN Environment Programme, Jan Eliasson, Ambassador of Sweden, Richard Gardner of Columbia University, Michio Kaku of City University of New York Graduate Center, Stephen Lewis of Canada, Janice Love of the World Council of Churches, Edward Luck of UNA-USA, Hamid Mowlana of American University, Juan Somavia, Ambassador of Chile, Enrique ter Horst of the United Nations, and Valentina Tereshkova of the Soviet Union. **Contact:** Farouk Mawlawi, Room S-1037D, United Nations, New York N.Y. 10017. (Tel: 212 963 7234, Fax: 212 963 6914)

The Second International Conference on a More Democratic United Nations (CAMDUN-2) will be held at the Vienna Intl. Centre from 17-19 September. The Conference, to be opened by VIC Director-General Ms. Margaret Anstee, is entitled "The United Nations and a New World Order for Peace and Justice." **Contact:** CAMDUN, c/o Medical Association for Prevention of War, 60 Holloway Rd., London. N194DJ (Tel: 01 272 0024, Fax: 01 281 5717)